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the region (no income ﬂight), water trading enhances regional welfare. We then show
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under income ﬂight, if the income ﬂight problem is not too serious, water trading can
enhance regional welfare.
∗THEMA, Université Paris X Nanterre, France
†Professor, Department of Applied Economics, University of Minnesota, St. Paul, MN
‡Associate Professor, Department of Applied Economics, University of Minnesota, St. Paul, MN
§Senior authorship not assigned.
¶Copyright 2004 by J-M Bourgeon, K Easter, RBW Smith. All rights reserved. Readers may make
verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this copyright
notice appears on all such copies.
1WATER MARKETS AND THIRD PARTY EFFECTS
1 Introduction
With the increased scarcity of water there has come an increased interest in using market
mechanisms to allocate water (Easter et al., 1998). And although market mechanisms have
found an occasional home, to date, most trade has occurred among users within a water dis-
trict and within the same use category, e.g., farmer to farmer trades. In Chile water markets
exist in select areas in the north and within small river basins (Bauer, 1998), and trading
there has been mostly among irrigators. Limited trades between irrigators and the urban
sector have occurred, but these trades did not involve fallowing or retiring land. Northern
Colorado has an active market but most of the trading is among farmers in the same water
district. Little trade has occurred among water districts or watersheds or among diﬀerent
types of uses (irrigation vs. urban use). Two notable exceptions are the California Water
Bank and the Colorado/Big Thompson project (Easter and Archibald, 2001). Although the
California Water Bank has moved large quantities of water over long distances and among
diﬀerent uses, it is not a true market in that prices are ﬁxed by the government and do
not adjust to supply and demand forces. Prices are determined by market forces in the
Colorado/Big Thompson project, but the trading has involved small amounts of water as
compared to California Water Bank trades.
One explanation for the dearth of water markets and trading is the belief that expansion
of water markets will lead to losses in local business income. The argument goes as follows.
With the opening up of water markets, water might have higher value outside of agriculture
and farmers will sell their water to urban users or to irrigators outside the local district.
If so, and if a signiﬁcant number of farmers sell their water outside the production region,
irrigation falls, land retirement increases and agricultural production falls. The resulting
drop in production causes a decrease in local demand for inputs and processing services,
which reduces demand for local business services. In addition to ﬁnding disfavor among
local businesses, farmers planning to remain in agriculture would likely not favor water
trading because such trades are believed to have negative impacts on agricultural land prices
1(Haddad, 2000).
Given the beliefs above, it is not unusual to see local businesses voice opposition to water
trading (Easter and Smith, 2004). Howitt and Vaux (1995) have suggested that because of
the impacts of water trades on local business, California may need to limit water sold from
each county. This would prevent sales from being concentrated in just a few counties. The
State of California took the suggestion somewhat further and banned all water sales based
on land fallowing which appeared to satisfy many of the local business concerns. However,
wholesale resistance to water trading is not necessarily the best course of action to take.
For instance, in the Westlands Water District in central California, irrigators ﬁrst tended
to oppose interdistrict water transfers. As water trading developed, however, local markets
expanded and revealed the potential beneﬁts from water trading. Local resistance then
turned to support (Easter and Archibald, 2001). The resistance to water trading by local
businesses and farmers, combined with the Westlands Water District experience suggests
we should examine more closely the potential impact of water trading on local/regional
economies.
Past empirical papers have argued that water trading has both improved and hurt local
economies (see for instance, Howe and Goemans (2003)). This paper attempts to tie these
stories together with a common conceptual underpinning. This paper develops a formal
analytical model that can serve as a tool for examining the (general equilibrium) economic
impacts of water market creation on a small, but open, rural economy with heterogenous
land quality. We consider two types of possible policies. One scheme — often implemented
in the Western U.S. — consists in assigning to farmers appropriative rights to the water
resource. The second scheme — typical in European countries, e.g., France — presumes a
water authority manages and sells the resource, and that farmers are subsidized for their
water expenses. Among other things we show if all income from water proceeds remains in
the region, then the rural economy expands with water trading. Also, the service sector as a
whole beneﬁts from water trading, but agricultural service providers can deﬁnitely lose as a
result of such trades and the impact of water trading on land values is ambiguous. If water
proceeds exit the region — income ﬂight — the region may or not beneﬁt from water trading.
Section 2 presents a model economy in which agents are given property rights on water
2and use their endowment of labor and (heterogeneous) land to produce either an irrigated
agricultural product or a service good. Section 3 examines the equilibrium properties of the
model when water income stays in the region. Section 4 compares this situation to a scheme
where farmers are not assigned property rights on water but are subsidized for their water
expenses. Section 5 examines the equilibrium properties of the property rights model when
income leaves the region. The last section concludes and provides suggestions for further
research.
2 The Model
Consider a small rural economy with two productive sectors: agriculture and services. The
agricultural sector produces the traded composite good ya, while the service sector produces
the non-traded composite good ys. Agricultural production requires land, water, services,
and labor inputs, while services are produced using labor and sector speciﬁc capital K.
Local production does not aﬀect the agricultural commodity’s price, and we normalize that
price to 1. We view the service industry as performing two primary functions: (i) It provides
(household) consumption services for the region (e.g., restaurants, movies, health care, etc.);
and (ii) it provides the agricultural sector with support services (implement repairs) and
intermediate inputs (fertilizer, pesticides, etc.). Being a non-traded good, the service good’s
price p is endogenous.
The economic agents in the region are represented by a continuum with total mass nor-
malized to one. Each agent is endowed with one unit of labor, one parcel of land, and an
equal share of capital K. They earn revenues by either producing the agricultural commod-
ity, or by producing services and possibly selling water. Revenues are used to purchase the
agricultural commodity, services, and a composite import good. Local consumption of the
imported composite good does not aﬀect its price, denoted pm. The total water endowment
of the region is normalized to one and if sold outside the region, is sold at the ongoing price
pw.
32.1 Consumption and production
Consumer welfare is indexed to the welfare of a representative consumer whose preferences
are typiﬁed by the homothetic utility function U(qa,q s,q m),w h e r eqa,qs and qm respectively
denote the aggregate (regional) household consumption of services, food/agriculture, and
the imported composite good. We assume U(·)is an increasing, concave function of the
consumption bundle. The corresponding aggregate expenditure function is given by,








where E(·) satisﬁes the following properties: (i) increasing in ¯ u, (ii) increasing, homogenous
of degree one, and concave in prices, and (iii) satisﬁes Shephard’s lemma. Given U(·) is
homothetic, we have
E(p,pm, ¯ u)=e(p)¯ u
where, suppressing the constant pm,e (p) is the unit expenditure function. Note that the
unit expenditure function can be interpreted as a cost of living index.
The service good is produced using labor and the sector speciﬁca s s e tK.L e tls denote
the aggregate amount of labor devoted to service production. Then net service sector revenue








Here w denotes the wage rate, and f(·) is a diﬀerentiable, non-decreasing function, that is
concave in both arguments and satisﬁes constant returns to scale. Given the properties of
f (·), the indirect function Gs(·) is continuous and convex in w and p. Using Hotelling’s










Land quality is heterogeneous and is indexed by the location/quality index α ∈ [0,1]:
the worst quality land is located at α =0 , while the best quality land is located at α =1 .
4Nature randomly assigns a unique land quality to each agent, and in what follows we index
each agent by the parameter α. The agricultural technology is “Leontief-like” in the sense
that farming a parcel of land requires a unit of labor, a unit of water, and a fraction ρ of the
service good. Such an application of inputs to land at location α yields output φ(α)=α.
By “Leontief-like” we mean, if a farmer applies to his parcel of land, a unit of labor, a unit
of water, and 2ρ units of the service good, he or she would still realize only φ(α)=α units
of output. On the other hand, combining 0.5ρ units of the service good with a single unit of
the other inputs yields zero output. Note, given there is only unit of each quality land, the
output at location α is either equal to 0 or α.
The economic rent of farming the land located at α is given by
π(α)=α − ρp − w − pw, (1)
and corresponds to the market value of production at location α less the market value of the
productive inputs.
2.2 Water managment practices: quantity restrictions and subsi-
dies
In what follows an agent either farms his or her parcel, or abandons the land to join the man-
ufacturing sector. The resulting labor allocation across agricultural and service production
depends on incentives given by public regulations and particularly on the allocation of water
property rights. In the Western U.S., water rights are typically appropriative use, with a
“ﬁrst in time, ﬁrst in right” clause. To introduce the possibility that agents may or may not
be able to sell water outside the region, or if water trading is allowed but restricted, deﬁne
the exogenous water trading parameter σ ∈ [0,1]. If σ =0water trading is not allowed, and
if σ =1full water trading is allowed. A value of σ ∈ [0,1] is a crude attempt to capture
institutional limitations on water trading. For example, if σ =0 .5 only half of the available
water is tradeable. Then, the eﬀective per-unit value of water is given by σpw.
Under such a scheme, as a farmer the type-α agent’s income is equal to α − ρp.T h i s
follows because the farmer is self-employed and does not have to pay for water. On the
other hand, as a laborer, the agent sells what water she can and earns wage w. In such
5a case, the agent’s income is equal to w + σpw. Then the type-α agent exits agriculture if
α − ρp ≤ w + σpw,or
α ≤ αI ≡ ρp + w + σpw, (2)
where αI denotes the agent who is indiﬀerent between farming or working in the manufac-
turing sector. The farmer’s income, α − ρp,i sd i ﬀerent from the (true) economic rent from
farming π(α) and condition (2) is equivalent to
π(α)+( 1− σ)pw > 0,
i.e., the true proﬁt from farming augmented by a per-unit water subsidy, τpw =( 1− σ)pw,
is positive. Hence, a policy of granting appropriative use rights to all agents in the re-
gion combined with restrictions on water sales has the same eﬀect on labor allocations as a
subsidy-taxation scheme with an unrestricted water market. In particular, the labor alloca-
tion under appropriative use with no water trades (i.e. σ =0 ) is the same as that of assigning
the water to a water authority (a benevolent regulator), removing all water trading restric-
tions, and having farmers pay for the water — but subsidizing the farmers’ water expenses.
We refer to the scheme with appropriative use rights and water trading restrictions as the
appropriative use (AU) policy, and refer to the second scheme as a pure subsidy (PS) policy.
The AU policy with unrestricted water markets (σ =1 ) has a labor allocation equivalent
to a PS policy where farmers receive no water subsidies and pay the true economic cost of
water. For σ>0, the farmers’ revenue is greater under an AU policy than a PS regulation
since individuals who farm their plots have no water expenses if they are assigned property
rights on the resource, while they incur the expense σpw under PS.
The same is true at the aggregate level: although the AU and PS policies generate
the same labor allocations across the agricultural and service sector, their eﬀects on the
aggregate revenue are diﬀerent. Consider ﬁrst the revenue generated by the AU policy: A
fraction 1 − αI of agents use their share of water for farming and thus their true economic
proﬁti si n c r e a s e db ypw, the cost of water they do not pay. The other fraction of agents αI
are only entitled to sell a fraction σ of their water endowment, which corresponds to each
seller earning σpw on the water market. It follows that the total water revenue under an AU
policy is pw [1 − (1 − σ)αI]. Then, for given levels of p,w, and water trading restrictions σ,






π(α)dα + w + pw [1 − (1 − σ)αI], (3)
where income is derived from services, agricultural production, and water sales. Under a PS
policy, the revenue generated by the water authority selling the water is pw, regardless of
who pays for it. Such subsidies are simply transfers from taxpayers to farmers, and have no
eﬀect on aggregate revenue. Consequently, for given p,w and σ, the aggregate income under






π(α)dα + w + pw. (4)
3A n a l y s i s o f A U a n d P S P o l i c i e s
We now examine the impact of water trading on regional welfare and income distribution
under the AU and PS policy on: (i) aggregate regional income, and its distribution across
agricultural and service providers, (ii) the labor shares across agricultural and service pro-
duction activities, and (iii) the service price and land rental values. In what follows we
assume labor moves freely in and out of the region, and from the standpoint of the region,
the equilibrium wage rate is exogenous and equal to ¯ w.
3.1 AU Policies
Deﬁnition 1. A competitive equilibrium with quantity trading restrictions σ is character-
ized by a service price p∗ and welfare level ¯ u∗ such that




∗, ¯ w)=Ep (p
∗, ¯ u
∗)+ρ(1 − αI) (5)
and








π(α)dα +¯ w + pw [1 − (1 − σ)αI] (6)
where the farm labor threshold αI is given by (2) with p = p∗.
7When characterizing the eﬀect of a AU policy on the market equilibrium, it proves con-
venient to deﬁne the household share of income spent on the service good (for given service
good price p)b ys(p) ≡ pqs/E.W eh a v et h ef o l l o w i n gr e s u l t :
Claim 1 . As water trading restrictions ease, i.e., as σ increases:





(ii) the price of the service good increases if the consumers’ share of the budget spent on





Proof. See Appendix A.
The obvious implication of Claim 1 part (i) is, under AU, a complete removal of water
trading restrictions yields maximal regional welfare. Of course, the model as presented here
assumes no income leaves the region, and as such, provides theoretical support for one of the
case studies discussed in Howe and Goemans (2003).
Part (ii) of Claim 1 tells us the impact of water trading on service good prices is ambiguous
and gives a suﬃcient condition for the service price to increase. This result reﬂects the fact
that an increase in water trading has both demand and supply side impacts on the service
sector. On the demand side, with the sale of water, regional income increases, and as income
increases the household demand for services increases, with the importance of household
s e r v i c ed e m a n di n d e x e db ys(p). On the supply side, as water leaves agriculture, labor
leaves agriculture and joins the service sector. Also, as the input demand for services by
agriculture falls, labor already in the service sector begins producing the household service
good, and the rate at which this occurs is proportional to ρ. Hence, increased water trading
leads to an increase in household service good production.
Whether the supply or demand side eﬀect dominates depends on the relative size of s(p),
ρ and the service price adjusted wage, ¯ w/p. If the adjusted wage is small compared to ρ,
8the supply side eﬀect dominates and the service price falls. If the adjusted wage is large
compared to ρ, the exodus of labor to the service sector is dampened enough for demand
side eﬀects to dominate service sector expansion, and the service price increases. In the
extreme case where ρ =0 , services are consumed only by the household. In such a case, as
regional income increases with water sales, the increase in aggregate demand dominates the
increase in service production, and the service price increases.
We now show that if the household spends any income on service good consumption, then
as water trading increases, household service consumption increases. We show this using the
properties of the expenditure function, e(p)¯ u, and the aggregate service supply function Gs
p.













where e00 < 0,e 0 > 0, and
d¯ u
dσ
> 0. Consequently, when the service good price falls,
dxc
dσ
is positive and household service consumption increases. On the other hand, if the service









Since agricultural production falls, we know the demand for services coming from the agricul-
tural sector falls. Hence, if aggregate service output increases it must follow that household
service consumption increases. This also tells us that when the service price increases,
e0 (p)
d¯ u
dσ > −e00 (p)¯ u
dp
dσ, i.e., the welfare eﬀects of increased water trading, e0 d¯ u
dσ, dominate the
price eﬀects −e00¯ u
dp
dσ.
In general, the change in aggregate revenue received by the service sector given a change












the sign of which increases (decreases) as the service price increases (decreases). Revenue
received by agricultural service providers is equal to ρp[1 − αI]. Taking the total derivative
of ρp[1 − αI] and rearranging terms gives
d
dσ









9Then if the service price falls agricultural service income necessarily falls. If the service price
increases, then the impact of water trading on agricultural service income is ambiguous. It is
obvious, however, that although service sector revenues might increase, agricultural service
revenue can deﬁnitely fall.
To examine the impact of water trading on land rental rates, take the total diﬀerential
of the land rental function π (α)=α − ρps − w − pw. Then the change in land rental rates







If the service price increases, land rental values fall and the opposite occurs with a decrease
in the service price.
3.2 PS policies
We now examine the impact of a PS policy on aggregate welfare and compare the relative
merits of both policies. In this section we assume the entire water endowment is sold at
price pw by the benevolent regulator. A market equilibrium under a PS policy is deﬁned as
follows:
Deﬁnition 2. A competitive equilibrium with subsidization at rate τ =1−σ is character-
ized by a service price p∗ and welfare level ¯ u∗ such that
















π(α)dα +¯ w + pw (7)
where the farm labor threshold αI is given by (2) with p = p∗.
The following result shows that — when compared to the zero subsidy case — a small
farmer water subsidy increases service sector revenue.
10Claim 2 . A small level of subsidization increases the price of the service good.
Proof. See Appendix B.
This can be easily understood observing that a small subsidy only has second order-eﬀects
on the aggregate income (4) (and thus on the welfare level of the representative consumer),
but a ﬁrst-order eﬀect on the farmers’ demand for service goods. Hence a small farmer water
subsidy leads to an increase in service sector revenues with only a negligeable impact on
the overall welfare. However, farmer water subsidies are costly in terms of aggregate welfare
losses when the ﬁnancial support provided to farmers becomes non neglegible. Besides, as
the next result reveals, large water subsidies may also hurt the service sector







Proof. See Appendix C.
Consequently, if the household share of income spent on the service good is high, then
increasing farmers’ subsidies leads to a fall of the service sector price. The threshold level
given by (8) is simply the relative proportion of the farmer’s service cost over the water
subsidy. Since s(p) < 1, the water subsidy will not trigger a decrease in the price of the
service sector good as long as the water subsidy is smaller than the farmer’s cost of services.
One can also deduce from claim 3 that the service sector price will be greatest when the




The reader can verify that if expression (8) holds, as τ increases, the service price increases





















11(iii) agricultural service income increases
d
dτ
















3.3 Aggregate welfare comparisons under the AU and PS schemes
As mentioned above, for given p and w, ceteris paribus, the AU and PS policies generate
the same labor allocations across the agricultural and service sector but their impact on
individual and aggregate income is diﬀerent. At the aggregate level, using (3) and (4), we
obtain that for given p,w and σ<1
G
PS(p,w,σ) − G
AU (p,w,σ)=pw (1 − σ)αI > 0,
where pw (1 − σ)αI is the amount of water income the region loses under the AU water
trading restrictions. However, just because aggregate income under the PS scheme is greater
than that under the AU scheme, one must be careful in making direct comparisons of ag-
gregate welfare under the two schemes, as the service good price under the two schemes are
likely to diﬀer. However, we now show the service good price is higher under the PS scheme,
as is the level of regional welfare.








π(α)dα +¯ w + pw [1 − (1 − σ)αI]+k, (9)
where k ∈ [0,p w (1 − σ)αI]. Here, a value of k =0corresponds to the AU scheme and a
value of k = pw (1 − σ)αI corresponds to the PS scheme. Intermediate values of k correspond
to a subsidy policy where the water authority sells only a fraction of the surplus of water
over domestic usages. Diﬀerentiating the system (2), (5) and (9) with respect to p, ¯ u and k





ppdp = Eppdp + Epud¯ u − ρdαI (10)





ρdpdα − pw(1 − σ)dαI + dk. (11)






pp − Epp + ρ2 > 0,
while substituting π(αI)=−(1−σ)pw and
R 1
αI ρdpdα = ρ(1−αI)dp into (11), using expres-







As these results hold for all k and σ, we can conclude that PS schemes yield a higher
level of regional welfare than the AU scheme, and a higher service price.
4 Third party eﬀects with income ﬂight
This section takes a preliminary look at the potential impact of third party eﬀects on regional
welfare, given income ﬂight — the exact deﬁnition of which follows shortly. The objective of
this section is not to examine all of the impacts of water trading on regional equilibrium,
e.g., the impact of water trading on land rental rates and service income. Instead we set out
only to show that when a simple version of income ﬂight is introduced into the open labor
market model, water trading no longer leads to an unambiguous improvement in regional
welfare.
Figure 1 presents a graphical representation of labor market equilibrium when the labor
market is open. In Figure 1 the exogenous wage rate is ¯ w and the region’s labor endowment is
1. The service labor supply function is given by the upward sloping line ls = w+ρp∗ +σpw,
and the service sector’s inverse labor demand function is given by the downward sloping
function W s(p∗,l). Given ρ,σ, ¯ w, and pw, if the equilibrium price of services is p∗, then the
equilibrium level of labor supplied to the service sector is ls∗, the amount of service sector
labor demanded by the region is ls∗
d = W s(p∗,l), and la∗ =1− ls∗ units of labor remain in
13agriculture. In this case there is an excess supply of service labor in the region and ls∗ − ls∗
d
units of labor obtain employment outside the region (e.g., rural residents commute to the
city). On the other hand, if the equilibrium service price were p∗∗ >p ∗, then the regional
service labor demand curve might be the dashed function W s(p∗∗,l),while the service supply
function would shift out to ls = w+ρp∗∗+σpw. In this case there would be an excess demand
for service labor and urban residents would commute to the countryside. Of course, our
current analysis implicitly assumes commuting costs are zero.
1 l ls*




w = ls + rp** + σpw
0
w = ls + rp* + σpw
ld* ld** ls**
() l p W
s *, *
() l p W
s *,
Figure 1. Labor market equilibrium
I nw h a tf o l l o w sw ef o c u so nt h ec a s ew h e r el a b o rl e a v e st h er e g i o n . 1 In such a case we
can deﬁne commuter income as (¯ w + σpw)[Gs
w (p, ¯ w) − αI].
To introduce income ﬂight we ﬁrst assume a fraction γ ∈ [0,1] of commuter income is
1We have shown the region is better oﬀ with water trading with no income ﬂight. With more income
ﬂowing into the region aggregate welfare should improve even more. In this sense, the case where urban
labor ﬂows into the region is uninteresting.
14spent outside the region. Then the value of income leaving the region is equal to
γ (¯ w + σpw)[G
s
w (p, ¯ w) − αI] ≤ 0
A simple way to introduce income ﬂight is by appending this term to the Walras condition
in Deﬁnition 1.2 This gives the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 4. A competitive equilibrium with income ﬂight, quantity trading restrictions,
and open labor markets is characterized by a service price p∗ and welfare level ¯ u∗ such
that



















π(α)dα +¯ w + pw [1 − (1 − σ)α
∗
I] (13)






where the farm labor threshold is α∗
I ≡ ρp∗ +¯ w + σpw .
We now show that with income ﬂight, regional welfare does not necessarily improve with
water trading. From Claim 1, when γ =0(no income ﬂight) welfare is increasing. It is
proven in appendix that
2Strictly speaking, in the income ﬂight model aggregate welfare should be reinterpreted by assuming there














Then rural expenditures should be deﬁned as
E (p, ¯ u) ≡ min
½







decomposed into rural and urban expenditures. The reader can verify that the qualitative results below,
however, do not change.








w − αI − (¯ w + σpw)]
¡
ρ2 − Epp + Gs
pp
¢





then regional welfare falls with water trading.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Hence, if a “large enough” share of income leaves the region, we get the much feared result
that water trading hurts the local economy. In such a case even side payments (from within
the region) oﬀers no remedy to the problem. One ﬁnal comment on Claim is warranted.
The Claim holds only for a given (σ, γ) pair. Hence, even if income ﬂight occurs, it is still
possible that a nonzero level of water trading exits that will improve regional welfare. In
other words, for the sake of argument, say γ =0 .1 and at σ =0 .3 Claim 4 holds. It is
quite possible that if instead σ =0 .1, Claim 4 would not hold. If so, then compared to the
case where water trading were completely prohibited, regional welfare would be higher if 10
percent of the water could be traded.
5 Conclusion
There has been growing concern with the health of rural economies, and with impact of
policies designed to address concerns in one sector, but aﬀecting others, e.g., the impact of
water trading on service sector income. This paper develops a model where the rural economy
is endowed with labor, water and heterogeneous land, and uses these inputs to produce a
tradeable agricultural commodity and a non-traded composite service good. Here, the service
good can be consumed directly or used as an intermediate input in agricultural production.
The model examined two basic cases. In one case all income stayed in the region — no
income ﬂight — and in the other case some of the agents with low quality land sold their
water, left the region, and earned wage income in, say, a large urban wage market. In the
model with no income ﬂight, the following analytical results were obtained: Water trading
leads to (i) an expansion in aggregate service provision, an increase in household service
consumption, and a contraction of the agricultural sector and hence, the input demand of
services by agriculture; (ii) the price of services and land rental rates can either increase
16or fall and (iii) water trading yields an unambiguous improvement in regional welfare. In
general, one cannot tell what eﬀect water trading will have on nominal, aggregate GDP, or
on nominal service income. Real income, however, increases with water trading. The paper
also examined the possible impact that water subsidies can have on regional welfare, and
showed that water subsidies can have a negative impact on aggregate regional welfare. The
second model introduces income ﬂight. We focused only on the impact of water trading on
regional welfare, and showed that with income ﬂight, regional welfare can deﬁnitely fall. — a
result that does not occur without income ﬂight.
Fears of water trading are potentially justiﬁed if water trading triggers an exodus of
labor, and its income, from the region. The analysis here suggests that with income ﬂight,
aggregate regional GDP will fall and the residents can be worse oﬀ after opening the market
to water trades. On the other hand, if income stays in the community, fears that water
trading will trigger a decline in the regions’ economic health are understandable, but such
an event is not likely to happen. In fact, it is likely that water taxes combined with income
transfers could improve the living standards of all in the region. Also, although we do
not examine the economics of such a case, a decline in regional welfare would not likely
occur if producers sold water and used the proceeds from water sales to purchase water
saving irrigation technologies. The “ﬁxed-proportion type” technology used in the analysis
precluded an easy investigation of the economics of such choices.
The simple model presented here can serve as a point of departure to examine several
questions. For example, what is the eﬀect of water trading on service income and environ-
mental quality, or what policy instruments could/should be used to minimize losses to the
service sector and minimize losses in environmental quality and biodiversity.
17Appendix
AP r o o f o f C l a i m 1
(i) Taking the total derivative of expressions (2), (6) and (5) with respect to p and σ yields
dαI = ρdp + dσpw (14)
G
s
ppdp = Eppdp+ Epud¯ u − ρdαI (15)
Epdp + Eud¯ u = G
s
pdp − π(αI)dαI −
Z 1
αI
ρdpdα − pw(1 − σ)dαI + pwαIdσ. (16)
Using π(αI)=−(1 − σ)pw,
R 1
αI ρdpdα = ρ(1 − αI)dp and (5), (16) simpliﬁes to
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pp − e00¯ u + ρ2












Since e is concave and Gs






ρ +¯ w/p + σpw/p
.
18B Proof of Claim 2
Take the total derivative of expressions (2), (7) and (5) with respect to p and σ to get:
dαI = ρdp + dσpw (17)
G
s
ppdp = Eppdp+ Epud¯ u − ρdαI (18)
Epdp+ Eud¯ u = G
s




Next, substitute π(αI)=−(1 − σ)pw and
R 1















































(1 − σ)pw − ρ
¸
pw.




(1 − σ)pwEpu/Eu − ρ
Gs
pp − Epp + ρ2 − ρ(1 − σ)pwEpu/Eu
.








pp − e00¯ u + ρ2 − τρpw(p)/p
.. (21)
Since e is concave and Gs










pp − e00¯ u + ρ2 > 0
hence a small water subsidy increases the service sector price.
CP r o o f o f C l a i m 3









pp − e00¯ u
Gs
pp − e00¯ u + ρ2 − ρτpws(p)/p
¸
. (22)
Since d¯ u/dτ ≤ 0 for all τ ∈ [0,1], the sign of dp/dτ only depends on the numerator of
(21), which leads to condition (8).
19D Proof of Claim 4
From computations developed in the proof of claim 1, it is easy to obtain that the total





















= pw [ρp +( 1− γ)(¯ w + σpw)+γ (G
s



















where ∆ = pw [ρp +( 1− γ)(¯ w + σpw)+γ (Gs
w − αI)],t h es i g no f∆ being ambiguous.












ρ2 − Epp + Gs
pp
¢










pp − Epp + ρ2¢





Epu > 0. Given H is positive, the
sign of both dp/dσ and d¯ u/dσ depend on the sign of their respective numerator. Rearranging
terms in the numerator of expression (26) reveals that d¯ u/dσ < 0 if
αI
¡
ρ2 − Epp + Gs
pp
¢





+( αI − Gs
w +¯ w + σpw)
¡
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